Moro Rebellion

Moro Rebellion

Aftermath of the First Battle of Bud Dajo.
Date 1899–1913
Location Philippines
Result United States victory.
Belligerents
 Philippines
Moro
 United States
Philippine Constabulary
Casualties and losses
10,000–20,000 killed United States:
130 killed
323 wounded
500 died of disease
Philippine Scouts:
116 killed
189 wounded
Philippine Constabulary:
1,500 casualties

The Moro Rebellion (1899–1913) was an armed military conflict between Moro revolutionary groups in the Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan (Minsupala) and the United States military which took place in the Philippines as early as between 1899 to 1913, following the Spanish-American War in 1898. The word "Moro" was a term for Muslims who lived in the southern Philippines, an area that includes Mindanao and its neighboring islands ( Sulu Archipelago ). Modern Muslim rebels of the southern Philippines see the Moro Rebellion as a continuing struggle against foreign rule.[1]

Contents

Background

The United States claimed the territories of the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. The Muslim population of the southern Philippines resisted both Spanish and United States colonization. The Spaniards were restricted to a handful of coastal garrisons and they made occasional punitive expeditions into the region. After a series of unsuccessful attempts during the centuries of Spanish rule in the Philippines, Spanish forces occupied the city of Jolo, the seat of the Sultan of Sulu, in 1876. The Spaniards and the Sultan of Sulu signed the Spanish Treaty of Peace on July 22, 1878. Control of the Sulu archipelago outside of the Spanish garrisons was handed to the Sultan. The treaty had translation errors: According to the Spanish language version, Spain had complete sovereignty over the Sulu archipelago, while the Tausug version described a protectorate instead of an outright dependency.[2] Despite this suspect claim to the Moro territories, Spain ceded them to the United States in the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War. Following the American occupation of the northern Philippines during 1899, Spanish forces in the southern Philippines were abolished, and they retreated to the garrisons at Zamboanga and Jolo. American forces took control over the Spanish government in Jolo on May 18, 1899, and at Zamboanga in December 1899.[3]

Brigadier General John C. Bates was sent to negotiate a treaty with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II. Kiram was disappointed by the hand-over of control to the Americans and had expected to regain sovereignty over his territory after the defeat of the Spanish. Bates' main goal was to guarantee Moro neutrality in the Philippine-American War, and to establish order in the southern Philippines. After some negotiation, the Bates Treaty was signed. This treaty was based on the earlier Spanish treaty, and it retained the translation error: the English version described a complete dependency, while the Tausug version described a protectorate. Although the Bates Treaty granted more powers to the Americans than the original Spanish treaty, the treaty was still criticized in America for granting too much autonomy to the Sultan. One particular clause, which recognized the Moro practice of slavery, also raised eyebrows in Washington, D.C. Bates later admitted that the treaty was merely a stop-gap measure, signed only to buy time until the war in the north was ended and more forces could be brought to bear in the south.[2]

In signing the treaty, Bates was not aware of a complicating factor: the nominal nature of the Sultan's authority. In theory, the Sultan of Sulu was the supreme authority in Moroland. The Sultanate of Maguindanao was independent and autonomous but recognized the supremacy of Sulu in religious and international matters. In reality, the Sultan of Sulu had less power than any of the major datus of the Sulu, and datus who had not been included in the treaty negotiations felt slighted and resisted recognition of the treaty. Matters were even worse on Mindanao. The Lake Lanao district was divided between more than 200 feuding datus, while the Cotabato area (the watershed of the Rio Grande de Mindanao) was under the loose overlordship of Datu Ali. In addition to the two true Sultans, there were some 32 self-proclaimed Sultans who laid claim to the title on the basis of controlling more territory than a normal datu.

The Bates Treaty did establish Moro neutrality in the Philippine-American War, and allowed the Americans to establish a few outposts in Moroland. American forces were organized into the military District of Mindanao-Jolo, under the command of General Bates. His forces were spread thin: there were only 2 infantry regiments in the entirety of Mindanao, giving the Americans only enough strength to control the District headquarters at Zamboanga and its surrounding peninsula. On March 20, 1900, General Bates was replaced by Brigadier General William A. Kobbe, and the District of Mindanao-Jolo was upgraded to a full Department. American forces in Mindanao were reinforced with a third infantry regiment. Garrisons were established at Jolo and thirteen other coastal towns throughout the Sulus, and stations were established at various places on the coast of Mindanao. During the winter of 1900-01, Moro hostility lessened, and Filipino forces in Moroland were driven into the hills. Trade revived, but so did slave raiding and piracy. Bandits attacked isolated American posts, and soldiers that went astray in the jungles faced attacks from juramentados.

Filipino Insurrectionist forces in the southern Philippines were commanded by General Capistrano, and American forces conducted an expedition against him in the winter of 1900–1901. On March 27, 1901, Capistrano surrendered. A few days later, General Emilio Aguinaldo's surrender on Luzon. This major victory in the war in the north allowed the Americans to devote more resources to the south, and they began to push into the interior of Moroland.

On August 31, 1901, Brig. Gen. George Whitefield Davis replaced Kobbe as the commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo. Davis adopted a conciliatory policy towards the Moros. American forces under his command had standing orders to buy Moro produce when possible and to have "heralds of amity" precede all scouting expeditions. Peaceful Moros would not be disarmed. Polite reminders of the America's anti-slavery policy were allowed.

One of Davis' subordinates, Captain John J. Pershing, assigned to the American garrison at Iligan, set out to better relations with the Moros of the Malanao tribes on the northern shore of Lake Lanao. He successfully established friendly relations with Ahmai-Manibilang, the retired Sultan of Madaya. Although retired, Manibilang was the single most influential personage among the fragmented inhabitants of the northern shore of the lake. His alliance did much to secure American standing in the area.

Conflict

Not all of Davis' subordinates were as diplomatic as Pershing. Many veterans of the Indian Wars took the "only good Indian is a dead Indian" mentality with them to the Philippines, and "civilize 'em with a Krag" became a similar catchphrase.[4][5] Three ambushes of American troops by Moros, one of which involved juramentados, occurred to the south of Lake Lanao, outside of Manibilang's sphere of influence. These events prompted Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, the military governor of the Philippines, to issue a declaration on April 13, 1902, demanding that the offending datus hand over the killers of American troops and stolen government property.

A punitive expedition under Col. Frank Baldwin set out to settle matters with the south-shore Moros. Although an excellent officer, Baldwin was "eager," and a worried Davis joined the expedition as an observer. On May 2, 1902, Baldwin's expedition attacked a Moro cotta at the Battle of Pandapatan, also known as the Battle of Bayan. Pandapatan's defenses were unexpectedly strong, leading to 18 American casualties during the fighting. On the second day, the Americans used ladders and moat-bridging tools to break through the Moro fortifications, and a general slaughter of the defenders followed.

The expeditionary force built Camp Vickers one mile south of Pandapatan, and Davis assigned Pershing to Baldwin's command as an intelligence officer and as director of Moro affairs. As director, Pershing had a veto over Baldwin's movements, which was an unstable arrangement. This arrangement was tested when survivors of Pandapatan began building a cotta at Bacalod. Baldwin wanted to move on the hostile Moros immediately, but Pershing warned that doing so could create an anti-American coalition of the surrounding datus, while some patient diplomacy could establish friendly relations with most of the Moros, isolating the hostile minority. Baldwin grudgingly agreed. On June 30, Pershing assumed command of Camp Vickers, and Baldwin returned to Malabang. A command the size of Camp Vickers would normally have gone to an officer with the rank of Major, and a careful shuffling of personnel would be required to ensure that reinforcements to the Camp did not include officers that were senior to Pershing.

On July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation declaring an end to the Philippine Insurrection and a cessation of hostilities in the Philippines "except in the country inhabited by the Moro tribes, to which this proclamation does not apply."[6] Later that month, Davis was promoted and replaced Chaffee as the supreme commander of American forces in the Philippines. Command of the Mindanao-Jolo Department went to Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner. Meanwhile, Pershing settled down to conduct diplomacy with the surrounding Moros, and a July 4th celebration had 700 guests from neighboring rancherias. In September 1902, he led the Macui Expedition, which resulted in a victory that did much to establish American dominance in the area. On February 10, 1903, Pershing was declared a datu by the formerly hostile Pandita Sajiduciaman of the Bayan Moros (who had been defeated at the Battle of Pandapatan)—the only American to be so honored. Pershing's career at Camp Vickers culminated in the March Around Lake Lanao during April and May 1903. Also known as the Marahui Expedition, it included the Battle of Bacolod and First Battle of Taraca but was otherwise peaceful. This expedition quickly became a symbol of American control of the Lake Lanao region and was regarded as a landmark event by the inhabitants of that region.

While Pershing was working to the south of Lake Lanao, Major Robert Lee Bullard was working to the north, building a road from Iligan to Marahui. Although never officially declared one, like Pershing, he was regarded as a datu by the Moros. Because of the Lake Lanao Moros' very personalistic style of leadership, they had troubles seeing them as two officers in the same army. Instead, they saw them as two powerful chieftains who might become rivals. During Pershing's March Around Lake Lanao, one Moro ran to Bullard, exclaiming that Pershing had gone juramentado, and that Bullard had better run up the white flag (signaling that they had no quarrel with Pershing's troops). Bullard was unable to explain to the Moro why he was not worried about Pershing's approach. On another occasion, a powerful datu proposed an alliance with Bullard, for the purposes of defeating Pershing and establishing overlordship over the entire Lake Lanao region. On June 1, 1903, the Moro Province was created, which included "all of the territory of the Philippines lying south of the eight parallel of latitude, excepting the island of Palawan and the eastern portion of the northwest peninsula of Mindanao."[7] The province had a civil government, but many civil service positions, including the district governors and their deputies, were held by members of the American military. The governor of the province served as the commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo. This system of combined civil and military administration had several motivations behind it.‭ ‬One was the continued Moro hostilities.‭ ‬Another was the Army's experience during the Indian Wars,‭ ‬when it came into conflict with the civilian Bureau of Indian Affairs.‭ ‬A third was that the Moros,‭ ‬with their feudal,‭ ‬personalistic style of government,‭ ‬would have no respect for a military leader who submitted to the authority of a non-combatant.‭

In addition to the executive branch, under the governor, the province also had a legislative branch: the Moro Council. This Council "consisted of the governor, a state attorney, a secretary, a treasurer, a superintendent of schools, and an engineer."[8] Although the governor appointed all of the other members of the council, this body was permanent, and provided a more solid foundation for laws than the fiats of the governor, which might be overturned by his successor.

‭The province was divided into five districts, with American officers serving as district governors and deputy governors. These districts included: Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Sulu, and Zamboanga. The districts were sub-divided into tribal wards, with major datus serving as ward chiefs and minor datus serving as deputies, judges, and sheriffs. This system took advantage of the existing structure of Moro political society, which was based on personal ties, while paving the way for a more individualistic society, where the office, not the person holding it, would be given respect.

On August 6, 1903, Major General Leonard Wood assumed his position as the governor of Moro Province and commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo. Wood was somewhat heavy-handed in his dealing with the Moros, being "personally offended by the Moro propensity for blood feuds, polygamy, and human trafficking"[9] and with his "ethnocentrism sometimes [leading] him to impose American concepts too quickly in Moroland."[10] In addition to his views of the Moros, Wood also faced an uphill Senate battle over his appointment to the rank of Major General, which was finally confirmed on March 19, 1904. This drove him to seek military laurels in order to shore up his lack of field experience, sometimes leading the Provincial army on punitive expeditions over minor incidents that would have been better handled diplomatically by the district governors. The period of Wood's governorship had the hardest and bloodiest fighting of America's occupation of Moroland.

The Province under Leonard Wood (1903-1906)

Wood instituted many reforms during his tenure as governor of Moro Province:

Campaigns

Major military campaigns during Wood's governorship include:

Governorship of Tasker H. Bliss (1906–1909)

On February 1, 1906, Major. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss replaced General Wood as the commander of the Department of Mindanao-Jolo, and replaced him as governor of Moro Province sometime after the First Battle of Bud Dajo. Bliss' tenure is regarded as a "peace era", and Bliss launched no punitive expeditions during his term in office. However, this superficial peace came at the price of tolerating a certain amount of lawlessness. Constabulary forces in pursuit of Moro fugitives often found themselves forced to abandon their chase after the fugitives took refuge at their home cottas. The constabulary forces were outnumbered, and a much larger (and disruptive) expedition would have been required to dislodge the fugitives from their hiding place. However, this period also demonstrated the success of new aggressive American tactics. According to Rear Admiral D.P. Mannix who fought the Moros as a young lieutenant from 1907–1908, the Americans resorted to the extreme measure of wrapping dead Moros in pig's skin and "stuffing his mouth with pork" thereby creating a religious "defilement". By inference this eventually deterred the Moros from continuing with their suicide attacking tactics.[11]

Governorship of John J. Pershing (1909-1913)

On November 11, 1909, Major General John J. Pershing, the third and final military governor of Moro Province assumed his duties.

Reforms

Pershing enacted the following reforms during his tenure as governor:

Surrender

Law enforcement in the Moro Province was difficult. Outlaws would go to ground at their home cottas, requiring an entire troop of police or soldiers to arrest them. There was always the danger of a full-fledged battle breaking out during such an arrest, and this led to many known outlaws going unpunished. In 1911, Pershing resolved to disarm the Moros. Army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood (former Moro Province governor) disagreed with this plan, stating that the move was ill-timed and that the Moros would hide their best arms, turning in only their worst. Pershing waited until roads into the interior had been completed, so that government troops could protect disarmed Moros from holdouts. He conferred with the datus, who mostly agreed that disarmament would be a good idea – provided that everybody disarmed.

Six weeks before putting his disarmament plan in to action, Pershing informed Governor-General William Cameron Forbes, who agreed with the plan. Pershing did not consult or inform his commanding officer, Major. Gen. J. Franklin Bell. On September 8, 1911, Executive Order No. 24, which ordered the disarmament, was issued. The deadline for disarmament was December 1, 1911.

Resistance to disarmament was particularly fierce in the district of Jolo and led to the Second Battle of Bud Dajo (which, while involving roughly equivalent forces as the first battle, was far less bloody causing only 12 Moro casualties[12]), and the Battle of Bud Bagsak.

Transition to Civil Authority

By 1913, Pershing agreed that the Moro Province needed to transition to civil government. This was prompted by the Moro's personalistic approach to government, which was based on personal ties rather than a respect for an abstract office. To the Moros, a change of administration meant not just a change in leadership but a change in regime, and was a traumatic experience. Rotation within the military meant that each military governor could serve only for a limited time. Civil governors were needed in order to provide for a lengthy tenure in office. Until 1911, every district governor and secretary had been a military officer. By November 1913, only one officer still held a civil office – Pershing himself. In December 1913, Pershing was replaced as governor of Moro Province by a civilian, Frank Carpenter.

Casualties

During the Moro Rebellion, the Americans suffered clear cut losses, amounting to 130 killed and 323 wounded. Another 500 or so died of disease. The Philippine Scouts who augmented American forces during the campaign suffered 116 killed and 189 wounded. The Philippine Constabulary suffered heavily as well, more than 1,500 losses sustained, half of which were fatalities.

On the Moro side, losses were remarkably high, with several thousand killed and wounded. Estimates range from 10,000 to well over 20,000 killed, with an unknown number of wounded.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Understanding Bangsamoro Independence
  2. ^ a b Kho, Madge. "The Bates Treaty". PhilippineUpdate.com. http://www.hilippineupdate.com/Bates.htm. Retrieved 2007-12-02. 
  3. ^ Hurley, Victor (1936). "17. Mindinao and Sulu in 1898". Swish of the Kris. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Archived from the original on 2008-07-12. http://web.archive.org/web/20080712175811/http://www.bakbakan.com/swishk/swk3-17.html. Retrieved 2007-12-02. 
  4. ^ Simmons, Edwin H. (March 2003). "Civilize 'Em with a Krag". The United States Marines: A History. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. p. 68. ISBN 9781557508683. http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=-3SWUovKGzIC&pg=PA68. 
  5. ^ Hunt, Geoffrey (2006). "Civilize 'Em with a Krag". Colorado's Volunteer Infantry in the Philippine Wars, 1898–1899. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. p. 198. ISBN 9780826337009. http://books.google.com.ph/books?id=9IJa8cESNv0C&pg=PA147. 
  6. ^ "President Theodore Roosevelt's Proclamation Formally Ending the Philippine 'Insurrection' and Granting of Pardon and Amnesty". MSC Institute of Technology. July 4, 1902. http://www.msc.edu.ph/centennial/tr020704.html. Retrieved 2007-12-02. 
  7. ^ a b c Hurley, Vic (1936). "18. The Formation of the Moro Province". Swish of the Kris. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Archived from the original on 2008-07-12. http://web.archive.org/web/20080512001221/http://www.bakbakan.com/swishk/swk3-18.html. Retrieved 2007-12-02. 
  8. ^ Hagedorn 1931, p. 14, Volume 2
  9. ^ Bacevich, Andrew J. (March 12, 2006). "What happened at Bud Dajo". The Boston Globe. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2006/03/12/what_happened_at_bud_dajo/. Retrieved 2007-12-02. 
  10. ^ Birtle 1998, p. 164
  11. ^ Mannix, Daniel P., IV (1983). The Old Navy. MacMillan Publishing Company. p. 164. ISBN 978-0025794702. "...the custom of wrapping the dead man in a pig's skin and stuffing his mouth with pork. As the pig was an unclean animal, this was considered unspeakable defilement."  A compilation of the diary of Rear Admiral D.P. Mannix III.
  12. ^ Byler 2005

References

Further reading

External links